Publications

 Books, Monographs, Reports

>> Dawson, Mark, Henrik Enderlein and Christian Joerges (Editors): Beyond the Crisis: The Governance of Europe’s Economic, Political and Legal Transformation. Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015. 

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• Abstract: The euro crisis, the steps taken to manage it, and the resulting transformations have triggered a necessary process of reconsidering economic governance in the European Union. This volume examines the many open political, legal, and economic questions related to the functioning and fundamental structure of the Union as a whole and the economic and monetary union in particular. The contributions to this collection bring the perspectives of different academic disciplines to bear on the functional aspects of economic governance, the institutional transformations that have taken place, and their implications for the Union’s legitimacy. A separate chapter looks at inequalities in perceptions of economic conditions within the European Union to identify trends, particularly during the eurozone crisis. In doing so, the chapters in this volume take stock of the current situation, shed light on the dilemmas and challenges that must be recognised and addressed, and explore options for the way ahead.
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>> Enderlein, Henrik and Jean Pisani-Ferry: “Reforms and Investment and Growth: An Agenda for France, Germany and Europe”. Report to the French Minister for the Economy, Industry and Digital Affairs and to the German Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy. 2014.

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>> Dawson, Mark, Henrik Enderlein and Christian Joerges (Editors): The Governance Report 2015. Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015. 

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Abstract: After years of ad hoc crisis management, is the European Union on the right track? Can the European project maintain its role as a political model? What internal and external obstacles exist? The Governance Report 2015 takes an interdisciplinary approach to explore some of these questions, including how stability in the eurozone and the full integration of the European single market can be achieved, how new methods for consultation and decision-making have influenced the legal and institutional framework of the EU, and how crisis management has affected the Union’s legitimacy. The concept of exploratory governance, introduced in this Report, offers an approach to understand the complexities of decision-making processes in the wake of the euro crisis. In addition, a set of governance indicators measuring the convergence or divergence of EU member states in key outcomes over time can help to inform policy and analysis. Ultimately, the Report seeks answers to the question of what can make the European Union succeed, fail, or muddle through from a governance perspective.

>> Enderlein, Henrik (Coordinator), Peter Bofinger, Jean-Claude Piris, Paul de Grauwe, Maria Joao Rodrigues, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Andrés Sapir, and Antonio Vitorino, under the patronage of Jacques Delors and Helmut Schmidt "Completing the Euro – A Roadmap towards Fiscal Union in Europe. Report by the Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Group.” Paris: Notre Europe, 2012.

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>> Enderlein, Henrik, Sonja Wälti, Michael Zürn (Editors): Handbook of Multi-Level Governance, Edward Elgar Publishers, 2010.

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>> Enderlein, Henrik and Amy Verdun (Editors): EMU and Political Science: What have we learned? Routledge, 2010.

>> Begg, Iain, Henrik Enderlein, Jacques Le Cacheux, and Mojmir Mrak: Financing of the EU Budget. Report for the European Commission, 2008

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>> Enderlein, Henrik: Nationale Wirtschaftspolitik in der Europäischen Währungsunion, Frankfurt, Campus Verlag, 2004.

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Refereed Articles

>> Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch and Henrik Enderlein: “What Explains Sovereign Debt Litigation?“ The Journal of Law and Economics, forthcoming August 2015. A previous version is available as CESIFO Working Paper No. 5319

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​Abstract: We study the occurrence of holdout litigation in the context of sovereign defaults. The number of creditor lawsuits against foreign governments has strongly increased over the past decades, but there is a large variation across crisis events. Why are some defaults followed by a “run to the courthouse” and others not? What explains the general increase in lawsuits? We address these questions based on an economic model of litigation and a new dataset capturing the near-universe of cases filed against defaulting sovereigns. We find that creditors are more likely to litigate in large debt restructurings, when governments impose high losses (“haircuts”), and when the defaulting country is more vulnerable to litigation (open economies and those with a low legal capacity). We conclude that sovereign debt lawsuits can be predicted reasonably well with a simple framework from the law and economics literature.

>> Enderlein, Henrik, Julian Schumacher und Christoph Trebesch: “Schuldenkrisen im Wandel: Das neue Zeitalter von Staatsbankrotten und Umschuldungen”. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 55, 4/2014, pp. 674-698.

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​Abstract: Dieser Aufsatz beschreibt unterschiedliche Typen von Staatsbankrotten und weist auf Veränderungen seit der Mitte der 1990er Jahre hin. Er zeigt, warum das Thema für die internationale und vergleichende politische Ökonomie von Bedeutung ist, warum aber gerade die empirische Literatur an erheblichen Mängeln leidet. Ein Staatsbankrott beschreibt sehr unterschiedliche Phänomene, die hier anhand von 11 Kriterien dargestellt werden. Der Aufsatz stützt sich auf drei neue Datensätze, die deskriptiv auf Veränderungsprozesse hin ausgewertet werden. Dabei wird deutlich, dass sich bei ökonomischen Charakteristika, im juristischen und politisch-institutionellen Kontext sowie bei den Rahmenbedingungen im internationalen Finanzmarkt wichtige Veränderungen ergeben haben, die von der Forschung aufgegriffen werden sollten.

>> ​​​​Enderlein, Henrik: “Das erste Opfer der Krise ist die Demokratie: Wirtschaftspolitik und ihre Legitimation in der Finanzmarktkrise 2008-2013” Politische Vierteljahresschrift. 54, 4/2013, pp. 714-739.

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​​​Abstract: Ausgeprägte Wirtschafts- und Finanzmarktkrisen verstärken die Probleme kollektiver Entscheidungsfindung in Demokratien. Der Aufsatz stellt eine Typologie zu Entscheidungsmodi und Legitimation der Wirtschaftspolitik in normalen Zeiten und Krisenzeiten auf. Er zeigt, dass in Krisen wegen der verstärkt auftretenden zeitlichen Inkonsistenzen in Kombination mit hoher Verteilungsungewissheit eine „ad-hoc Technokratisierung“ der Wirtschaftspolitik entsteht. Die faktische Abspaltung wirtschaftspolitischer Entscheidungen vom input-basierten Legitimationsprozess ist demokratietheoretisch relevant, weil die Verteilungsimplikationen der Krisenpolitik in der Regel sehr hoch sind. Das resultierende „Demokratiedefizit“ ist allerdings nicht als Symptom der „Postdemokratie“ zu sehen, sondern als Folge der spezifischen wirtschaftspolitischen Anforderungen im Krisenkontext.

>> Enderlein, Henrik, Christoph Trebesch, and Laura von Daniels: „Sovereign Debt Disputes: A Database on Government Coerciveness During Debt Crises” Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 31(2), pp. 250-266.​

Abstract: This paper measures “debt disputes” between governments and foreign private creditors in periods of sovereign debt crises. We construct an index of government coerciveness, consisting of 9 objective sub-indicators. Each of these sub-indicators captures unilateral government actions imposed on foreign banks and bondholders. The results provide the first systematic account of debt crises that goes beyond a binary categorization of default versus non-default. Overall, government behavior and rhetoric show a strong variability, ranging from highly confrontational to very smooth crisis resolution processes. In a preliminary analysis on the determinants of coercive behavior, we find political institutions to be significant, while economic and financial factors play a lesser role. These results open up an agenda for future research.

>> ​Enderlein, Henrik and Amy Verdun: „EMU’s teenage challenge: what have we learned and can we predict from political science?“, in Journal of European Public Policy, 16:4, 2009, pp. 490-507

• ​Abstract: We review the initial predictions and claims regarding economic and monetary union (EMU) in Europe against the evidence of its first ten years of existence. We argue that pessimistic views on the creation of EMU have proved to be wrong. Yet EMU's success is rather puzzling, since it is based on a peculiar institutional structure not thought to lead to success. EMU has generated redistributive effects and may have increased business-cycle synchronization. Those effects have not translated into the expected decrease of legitimacy or a widespread democratic deficit of EMU. At the institutional level, EMU has coped well with an asymmetric framework, largely decoupling EMU from political union. There have been neither major spill-over effects pushing for further political integration nor conflict and disintegration. The main question for the future is whether this institutional structure will stay the same in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
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>> ​Enderlein, Henrik: „Desiderat Weltwirtschaftsregierung: Global Governance der Finanzmärkte“, in Leviathan, 2009, 37:1-8

>> Enderlein, Henrik: “The euro and political union: do economic spillovers from monetary integration affect the legitimacy of EMU?”, in Journal of European Public Policy, 13: 7, 2006, pp. 1133-1146

• Abstract: The technical and institutional achievements of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe (EMU) are just the necessary condition for its overall success: the sufficient condition implies a widespread acceptance of the spillover effects triggered by EMU for other areas of economic policy-making, such as possible redistributive effects across euro-area member states. The article notes that much of the recent academic debate on EMU's legitimacy can be reduced to differences in assumptions on those effects. It thus calls for resuming the debate with a specific emphasis on analysing data that would provide information on observable spillover effects from EMU and allow for more solid arguments in that debate.
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>> ​Enderlein, Henrik: “Adjusting to EMU: The impact of monetary union on domestic fiscal and wage-setting institutions”, in European Union Politics 7/1, March 2006, pp. 113-140.

• Abstract: The article suggests an explanation for seemingly diverse patterns of change in domestic economic institutions following the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It argues that EMU participants redesigned ill-fitting domestic fiscal and wage-setting institutions in order to counter the anticipated destabilizing effects of the ‘one size fits all’ monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). After outlining the argument, the article identifies general economic and institutional conditions that are required for the use of fiscal and wage-setting institutions as effective stabilizers in a monetary union. It then undertakes a comparative assessment to detect country-specific mismatches between anticipated needs and the available domestic economic institutions. Finally, the article surveys institutional changes in 10 member states between the mid 1990s and 2002 and shows that the observed institutional adjustments largely correspond to the expected correction of initial mismatches.
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​>> Enderlein, Henrik, Johannes Lindner, Oscar Calvo-Gonzáles, and Raymond Ritter: “The EU budget - how much scope for institutional reform?” in ECB Occasional Paper Series, No. 27, April 2005 (internal refereeing process at the ECB, also published in Helge Berger and Thomas Moutos: “Designing the New EU”, Amstedam: Elsevier, 2007)​

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• Abstract: This paper reviews current discussions on reforming the European Union (EU) budgetary procedure and assesses the main reform proposals that have been suggested thus far. It argues that prospects for reforms are presently hampered by the complex interplay between supranational and intergovernmental decision modes and the requirement of any budgetary procedure to strike a balance between efficiency and legitimacy. The paper reviews the main criticisms of the present budgetary procedure and the related reform proposals, which are assessed on the basis of relevant theoretical literature as well as brief comparisons with the federal budget of the United States. The paper argues that the current EU budgetary procedure maximises efficiency and legitimacy, given the present state of political integration in the EU. Significant modifications to the budgetary procedure would depart from that equilibrium.
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>> Enderlein, Henrik: “Break it, Don’t Fix it!”, in Journal of Common Market Studies, December 2004, pp. 1309-1046.

>> Enderlein, Henrik: “Adapt a Winning Team! Die Auswirkungen der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion auf Konjunkturzyklen und die wirtschaftspolitischen Institutionen: Österreich im europäischen Vergleich.“ In: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 2001/3, 257-274.

Book chapters

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• Enderlein, Henrik: “Towards an Ever Closer Economic and Monetary Union? The Politics and Economics of Exploratory Governance” in Dawson, Mark, Henrik Enderlein and Christian Joerges (Editors): “Beyond the Crisis The Governance of Europe’s Economic, Political, and Legal Transformation”, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 13-24.

• Dawson, Mark, Henrik Enderlein and Christian Joerges: “Introduction: The Governance of the Transformation of Europe’s Economic, Political, and Constitutional Constellation since the Euro Crisis” in Dawson, Mark, Henrik Enderlein and Christian Joerges (Editors): “Beyond the Crisis The Governance of Europe’s Economic, Political, and Legal Transformation”, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 1-12.

• Enderlein, Henrik: “The Euro as a Showcase for Exploratory Governance: Why There Are No Simple Answers” in: The Governance Report, Hertie School of Governance (editor), Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 25-40.

• Mark Dawson, Henrik Enderlein, and Christian Joerges: “Exploratory Governancein the Euro Crisis” in: The Governance Report, Hertie School of Governance (editor), Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 13-24.

• Mark Dawson, Henrik Enderlein, and Christian Joerges: “Where do the EU and the EMU Go from Here” in: The Governance Report, Hertie School of Governance (editor), Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 117-127.

• Enderlein, Henrik: “Solidarität in der Europäischen Union – Die ökonomische Perspektive” in: Europäische Solidarität und nationale Identität (EuDÖR 6). Calliess, Christian (Hrsg.): Mohr Siebeck, 2013, pp. 83-97.

• Enderlein, Henrik, Camillo von Mueller: “German Fiscal Federalism at a Crossroads: Between Crisis and Reform”, in: The Global Debt Crisis. Haunting U.S. and European Federalism. Paul E. Peterson, Daniel Nadler (eds), Brooking Institution Press, 2015.

• Enderlein, Henrik: „Welche Economic Governance für Europa? Die Vorschläge zur wirtschaftspolitischen Steuerung im Euroraum“ in Werner Weidenfeld / Wolfgang Wessels (Hrsg.): Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2012. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

• Enderlein, Henrik. Globale Ungleichgewichte und Governance. In: Außenpolitik in der Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise. Braml, Josef et al. (Hrsg), Oldenbourg Verlag, 2012.

• Enderlein, Henrik: “Economic policy-making and multi-level governance”, in: Enderlein, Henrik, Sonja Wälti, and Michael Zürn: Handbook on Multi-Level Governance, Edward Elgar, 2010.
• Michael Zürn, Sonja Wälti, and Henrik Enderlein: “Multi-Level Governance - An introduction”, in: Enderlein, Henrik, Sonja Wälti, and Michael Zürn: Handbook on Multi-Level Governance, Edward Elgar, 2010.
• Enderlein, Henrik, Laura Müller, and Christoph Trebesch: “On the Role of the Private Sector in Sovereign Debt Crises”, in: Risse, Thomas/Lehmkuhl, Ursula (Eds.): Governance Without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2010 (refereed)
• Enderlein, Henrik: “Wandel durch den Euro: Wie die Währungsunion die nationale Fiskal- und Lohnpolitik verändert”, in Martin Höpner und Armin Schäfer (Hrsg.) Die Politische Ökonomie der europäischen Integration, Campus (2008), pp. 415-448.

• Enderlein, Henrik: „Privat finanziert, öffentlich ausgerichtet: Die Hertie School of Governance als eine besondere Form von „Public Private Partnership“, in Klaus Siebenhaar (Hrsg.): Unternehmen Universität – Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft im Dialog, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp. 113-127.

• Enderlein, Henrik: “Makroökonomische Stabilisierung in Schuldenkrisen: Zur Bedeutung von Governance Aspekten in der Interaktion von privaten Gläubigern und staatlichen Schuldnern in Schwellenländern” in Thomas Risse und Ursula Lehmkuhl (Hrsg.): Regieren ohne Staat? Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit, (Schriften zur Governance-Forschung, Band 10), Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 309-331.
• Enderlein, Henrik and Johannes Lindner: “The EU Budgetary Procedure in the Constitutional Debate” in Jeremy Richardson (Ed.): European Union: Power and Policy-Making (3^rd edition). Routledge, pp. 187-205.
• Enderlein, Henrik: “Fraternal Twins: Why the Fed and the ECB are more similar than often suggested” in Jens Hölscher and Horst Tomann (Eds.): Globalization of Capital Markets and Monetary Policy”, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005.

5.) Other publications (selection)

• Enderlein, Henrik, Joachim Fritz-Vannahme and Jörg Haas: Repair and Prepare: Strenghening Europe’s Economies after the Crisis. Joint Report, Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin and Bertelsmann Stiftung.
• Enderlein, Henrik and Eulalia Rubio: „25 years after the Delors-Report: Which lessons for Economic and Monetary Union.” Policy Paper No. 109 Notre Europe and Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin.
• Enderlein, Henrik, Lucas Guttenberg, Jann Spiess: “Making One Size Fit All: Designing a Cyclical Adjustment Insurance Fund for the Eurozone”. Policy Paper No. 61, Notre Europe.
• Enderlein, Henrik: The Economic Impact of the Deutsche-Börse-NYSE Euronext Merger on the European Financial Markets, Expert Study commissioned by Deutsche Börse AG, 2011, 66 pages. Available online: http://www.hertie-school.org/fileadmin/images/Downloads/enderlein_merger_Study/Enderlein_mergerstudy_final.pdf
• Jürgen Habermas, Joschka Fischer, Henrik Enderlein und Christian Calliess: „Europa und die neue Deutsche Frage – ein Gespräch“, in Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 05/2011.
• Enderlein, Henrik: „Welche Economic Governance für den Europa? Die Vorschläge zur wirtschaftspolitischen Steuerung im Euroraum.“ In Werner Weidenfeld und Wolfgang Wessels: Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2011. Nomos, 2011, 37-44.
• Enderlein, Henrik: “Mehr Mut beim Euro!“, in Ulrike Guérot und Jacqueline Hénard: Was denkt Deutschland? KSV, 2011, 26-33.
• Peter Bofinger, Henrik Enderlein, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, André Sapir (with endorsements from Jacques Delors, Joschka Fischer, Romano Prodi, and Guy Verhofstadt): „Eurozone needs a permanent bail-out fund“ in Financial Times, 28 September 2010
• Enderlein, Henrik: „Die Krise im Euroraum: Auslöser, Antworten, Ausblick“, in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 43/2010
• Enderlein, Henrik: “Warum wir mehr Europa brauchen”, in Lehren aus der Finanzmarktkrise, Ein Comeback der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Sankt Augustin/Berlin, 2010, pp. 9-15.
• Enderlein, Henrik: „Global Governance der internationalen Finanzmärkte“, in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 08/2009
• Enderlein, Henrik: „USA nach der Wahl – welche Folgen sind für Europa zu erwarten? in: ifo Schnelldienst, 23/2008, 61. Jg., 49.-50. KW, 10.12.08

• Enderlein, Henrik: „Ein neues Verhältnis zwischen Staat und Markt“, Perspektive 21, Heft 41, Juni 2009.
• Enderlein, Henrik und Stormy Mildner: „Angstszenario US-Rezession“, in SWP-Aktuell 17, Februar 2008
• Enderlein, Henrik: “Wer regiert die internationalen Finanzbeziehungen?”, Internationale Politik, 6/2007, pp. 50– 57
• Enderlein, Henrik: “The Stability and Growth Pact is Broken? Don’t Fix it!” in EUSA Review, 18/1, Winter 2005.
• Enderlein, Henrik: “One Size Fits None” in Central Banking, XVI.1, August 2005
• Enderlein, Henrik: „Wechselnde Ansichten zu Wechselkursen: Über die Bedeutung der Verknüpfung politischer Lernprozesse und ökonomischer Mechanismen in der Geschichte der europäischen Währungskooperation.“ In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 41(4), 2000, 771-775.